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THE CONSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTS WITH 
SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO ORGAN PROCUREMENT* 
 
D Labuschagne** 
PA Carstens*** 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this article is to determine the influence that the Constitution has on the 
law pertaining to organ transplants, with specific reference to organ procurement 
methods.1 Whenever the demand for a particular resource is higher than the offer, 
there is a risk of a black market forming to compensate for the shortage.2 This is 
indeed the case when it comes to transplantable human organs. The organ shortage 
is by no means a new problem. Academics have been looking for a solution to this 
global problem since 1980.3 In the light of this, the authors find it intriguing that this 
problem still exists around the world and more specifically, in South Africa. According 
to the Organ Donor Foundation,4 the number of solid organ transplants has declined 
yearly from 376 in 2009 to 319 in 2012.5 Furthermore, the number of South Africans 
awaiting an organ transplant increased from 3 500 in 20096 to 4 300 in 2013.7 It has 
                                        
*  This article is based on an excerpt from an unpublished LLM dissertation by Labuschagne D An 
Analysis of Organ Transplantation with Specific Reference to Organ Procurement (LLM-
dissertation University of Pretoria 2013).  
** Debbie Labuschagne. LLB (UP). Academic Associate in the Department of Mercantile Law, 
University of Pretoria. Email: Debbie.Labuschagne@up.ac.za. 
*** Pieter A Carstens. PA BLC LLB LLD (UP). Professor in the Department of Public Law, University of 
Pretoria. Email: Pieter.Carstens@up.ac.za. 
1  The main organ procurement methods are opting-in; presumed consent; required request; 
required response, the sale of organs; and organ procurement from prisoners. 
2  For a discussion on market failure in the context of organ transplants, see Almeida Market 
Failure. See also S v Netcare Kwa-Zulu (Proprietary) Limited, Agreement in Terms of s105A(1) of 
Act 51 of 1977, Netcare Kwa-Zulu (Proprietary) Limited and the State (Commercial Crime Court, 
Regional Court of Kwa-Zulu-Natal) unreported case number 41/1804/2010 of 8 November 2010 
and Allain 2011 Med L Rev 117-122. 
3  Cooper et al 1982 SA Medical Journal 933-938; Ghods and Sava 2006 CJASN 1136-1145. 
4  The Organ Donor Foundation of South Africa (hereinafter "the ODF") is a non-profit organisation 
that was established in 1988. Their main website can be found at http://odf.org.za/. 
5  Organ Donor Foundation 2013 http://odf.org.za/2013-06-11-09-17-45/statistics.html. 
6  Organ Donor Foundation 2009 http://www.health24.com/Medical/Heart/Heart-
transplants/Organ-transplant-statistics-20120721. 
7  Organ Donor Foundation 2013 http://odf.org.za/2013-06-11-09-17-45/statistics.html. 
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also been claimed that there are as many as 15 000 people in need of a kidney 
transplant only, or renal dialysis.8 There is, of course, no certain way to determine 
the actual number of South Africans in need of an organ transplant, since there is no 
national waiting list available. All that can be said with certainty is that there are not 
enough organs being procured to meet the demand. It is therefore submitted that 
the current organ procurement method, namely opting-in,9 as embodied in the 
National Health Act,10 is unsuccessful in procuring enough transplantable organs to 
satisfy the demand for them. 
 
As a result of the shortage of organs, academics, both in South Africa,11 and 
abroad,12 are calling for a change in the method of procurement. The main organ 
procurement   methods   that   are  being  considered   are   opting-in;13   presumed  
consent;14 required request;15 required response;16 the sale of organs;17 and organ 
procurement from prisoners.18 
                                        
8  Molakeng date unknown http://www.hst.org.za/news/15-000-wait-donated-organs. 
9  Opting-in requires the consent of the donor, or in some cases relatives, for a valid donation. 
10  National Health Act 61 of 2003. The Act makes provision for both live and cadaveric donations 
upon the receipt of informed consent from the donor, or relatives, should the donor die without 
giving informed consent prior to death. 
11  See Slabbert Handeldryf; Fourie Analysis on the Doctrine of Presumed Consent; Slabbert 2008 
Koers  75; Venter Selection of Constitutional Perspectives; and Labuschagne Analysis of Organ 
Transplantation. 
12  See Barnett and Kaserman 1993 Issues in Law and Medicine 117; Spital 1996 Ann Intern Med 
66; Kwitowski 2005 J Med & L 141; Spellman 2006 Syracuse L Rev 353; Orentlicher 2008-2009 
Rutgers L Rev 295; and Ryan 2009 MSU J Med & L 427. 
13  Opting-in is based on obtaining informed consent from the donor and is widely used as a method 
of organ procurement, including in South Africa. It is also the only method of organ procurement 
ever applied in South Africa. See s 2 of the now repealed Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983, as well 
as ss 55-56 read together with ss 6-7 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003. For more on 
informed consent, see Van Oosten Doctrine of Informed Consent 1989. 
14  This method of organ procurement accepts or makes the rebuttable presumption that all the 
citizens have given informed consent to be organ donors upon their death. The consent is thus 
merely presumed and not in any way real, informed consent. If one does not want to be an 
organ donor, one must make this objection publicly known prior to death, in accordance with the 
requirements set out by the legislature; see Fourie Analysis on the Doctrine of Presumed 
Consent 49. 
15  Required request as a method of organ procurement places a duty on a certain group, usually 
employees of a specific state department, to request a person's donor status at certain specific 
events. The only duty therefore rests on the state employees to make an enquiry. There is no 
corresponding duty on the prospective donor to give a binding response. 
16  Required response, unlike opting-in or required request, places an active duty on the prospective 
donor to declare his or her donor status. 
17  The sale of organs entails the procurement of organs in exchange for monetary or other financial 
gain, and is typically structured as a futures contract. See Slabbert Handeldryf 150-151. 
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It is submitted that the best way to solve the current organ shortage in South Africa, 
is to review the different organ procurement methods in the light of their 
constitutional acceptability. According to section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996,19 the Constitution is the supreme law in the Republic of South 
Africa, to the extent that any law or conduct inconsistent with the Constitution is 
invalid. It is therefore clear that no attempt to alter the existing law can be 
successful without giving due consideration to the rights and values entrenched in 
the Constitution.20 To determine whether a certain constitutional right is being 
adhered to in the context of medical law, it is necessary to follow a multi-layered 
approach where one first looks at the Constitution, then at relevant legislation, the 
common law, case law and the relevant principles of medical ethics.21 It is thus 
essential to take into account all the different forms of law when dealing with any 
constitutionally entrenched right. The Bill of Rights lists all the rights entrenched in 
the Constitution and in addition, it deals with the application,22 limitation23 and 
interpretation24 thereof. 
 
For the purposes of this article it is therefore necessary to identify the following: the 
specific rights involved with the research topic; the scope of these rights; the 
application of the Bill of Rights; and the interpretation thereof; if these rights are 
justifiably limited under the current legislation; and if these rights can be justifiably 
limited in terms of proposed amendments to the current legislation and any other 
aspects relevant thereto. In doing this it is important to keep in mind that the 
provisions in the Constitution have in many cases deliberately been formulated very 
                                                                                                                          
18  There are basically two methods of harvesting organs from prisoners. The first is to procure 
organs from deceased prisoners before the bodies are released to family members. The second 
method involves rewarding prisoners who are also organ donors, thus reducing a prison 
sentence in response to donation. See Ryan 2009 MSU J Med & L 433. 
19  Hereinafter "the Constitution". 
20  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 7-8. Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 
10. 
21  For a more detailed explanation of the multi-layered approach, see Carstens and Pearmain 
Foundational Principles 1-2. For more on bioethics, see Beauchamp and Childress Principles and 
Moodley Medical Ethics. 
22  S 8 of the Constitution. 
23  S 36 of the Constitution. 
24  S 39 of the Constitution. 
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broadly,25 thus leaving the interpretation thereof to the courts and academics. The 
Constitution thus doesn't interpret itself and the interpretation of its provisions 
largely lies with the interpreter thereof. 
 
This article thus proceeds to deal with the application, limitation and interpretation 
of the rights in the Bill of Rights. Thereafter, each of the applicable rights is 
discussed separately with reference to legislation where applicable, considering the 
scope, interpretation and possible limitation of the specific right. A discussion of the 
development of relevant case law and its consequences is also included. 
 
2 The application of the Bill of Rights 
 
Before one can look at the different individual rights in the Bill of Rights, one must 
have an understanding of when the Bill of Rights will be applicable. Section 8 of the 
Constitution inter alia states that the Bill of Rights is applicable to all law, and 
binding on the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.26 
Section 8 further states that the common law must be applied and developed to the 
extent that legislation does not give effect to a right in the Bill of Rights.27 
 
It is important to note that the modes of application of the Bill of Rights can be 
categorised into various groups. A right can be applied either directly or indirectly,28 
vertically between the state and an individual, or horizontally between 
individuals.29,30 The Bill of Rights is binding on the legislature, the executive, the 
                                        
25   For instance s 11 of the Constitution, which states succinctly that: "Everyone has the right to 
life". 
26  S 8(1) of the Constitution. 
27  S 8(3) of the Constitution. 
28  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 32. The Bill of Rights is applied directly when the 
right of a beneficiary has been infringed by someone with a duty not to infringe the right. For 
more on the direct application of the Bill of Rights, see Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights 
Handbook 35-64. When the Bill of Rights is applied indirectly, it is applied during the 
interpretation, development or application of the common law or legislation. For more on the 
indirect application of the Bill of Rights, see Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 64-72. 
For more on the application of the Bill of Rights in general, see Chapter 31 of Woolman et al 
Constitutional Law. 
29  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 43-55. 
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judiciary, all organs of state,31 natural persons and juristic persons32 (to the extent 
required by the nature of the rights and the juristic person).33 From this it is clear 
that the Bill of Rights enjoys wide application. 
 
There are two facts stated above that are of particular importance for the purposes 
of this discussion. Firstly, the fact that the Bill of Rights binds the state deserves 
further discussion. "Section 8(1) binds all organs of state in all spheres of 
government to comply with the Bill of Rights."34 Organs of state are expressly 
defined in section 213 and include the Department of Health and public hospitals.35 
In the context of socio-economic rights, these are the organs of state involved with 
and influenced by medical law, together with the legislature. This brings us to the 
second fact that deserves further discussion: the fact that the Bill of Rights is also 
binding on the legislature.36 If any legislation does not comply with the Bill of Rights, 
it must be declared invalid, according to section 172(1) of the Constitution.37 This 
has the consequence that legislation can be tested against the Bill of Rights, and if 
found inconsistent with the Constitution it will consequently be declared invalid. 
 
When it comes to considering the validity of an organ procurement method, the Bill 
of Rights will therefore be applied horizontally between the state and individuals, to 
determine if the state has complied with its duties. This is of particular importance in 
                                                                                                                          
30  In Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) 861 the court explained the difference between the 
vertical and horizontal application of the Bill of Rights: "The term 'vertical application' is used to 
indicate that the rights conferred on persons by a bill of rights are intended only as a protection 
against the legislative and executive powers of the state in its various manifestations. The term 
'horizontal application' on the other hand indicates that those rights also govern the relationships 
between individuals, and may be invoked by them in their private law disputes." 
31  S 8(1) of the Constitution. Cheadle is of the opinion that "all law" for the purposes of s 8(1) 
includes legislation, common law rules, and customary law. Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South 
African Constitutional Law 3-10, 3-15. 
32  S 8(2) of the Constitution.  
33  S 8(4) of the Constitution. Cheadle states that the primary function of a constitution is to both 
empower and restrain the state in various aspects. Cheadle et al South African Constitutional 
Law 3-2. 
34  Cheadle et al South African Constitutional Law 3-15.  
35  S 213 of the Constitution. 
36  S 8(1) of the Constitution. 
37  S 172(1) of the Constitution states that: "When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, 
a court- (a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is 
invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and (b) may make any order that is just and 
equitable…" 
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the light of section 27(2), which places a duty of progressive realisation of certain 
rights on the state, a duty which will be discussed below.38 For the purposes of this 
article, as it deals primarily with the current legislation regarding methods of organ 
procurement, as well as the lack thereof, together with possible amendments that 
will have to be tested against the Constitution and enforced by the Department of 
Health and hospitals, the Bill of Rights will almost always be applicable. 
 
3 The limitation clause39 
 
The limitation clause makes provision for the rights in the Bill of Rights to be limited. 
However, to be a valid limitation, a list of requirements must be met. Section 36 of 
the Constitution states that the rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only by law 
of general application, provided that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.40 
 
Prima facie, it is clear that the rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited and are thus 
not absolute.41 However, to be a valid limitation the abovementioned requirements 
have to be met. The fact that rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited in only terms 
of law of general application can be both positive and negative. On the positive side, 
this eliminates the possibility of discrimination and inequality. On the negative side, 
it raises the question: What happens when an individual wants to limit his or her 
constitutional rights? Does this constitute an unjustifiable limitation on the grounds 
that it is not in terms of law of general application, or are there now other rules in 
play? 
 
The first requirement is that the limitation must be made in terms of law of general 
application. Although "law" itself hasn't been interpreted by the Constitutional Court, 
                                        
38  S 27(2) of the Constitution states that "[t]he state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these 
rights". 
39  S 36 of the Constitution. 
40  S 36 of the Constitution. 
41  S 36(1) of the Constitution. 
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it seems that "law of general application" includes all forms of legislation, the 
common law,42 and customary law.43 
 
As stated above, if the limitation is not a limitation in terms of law of general 
application, the limitation clause will not be applicable. The question is thus: can a 
right in the Bill of Rights be limited by means other than the limitation clause, and if 
so, what are these means and to what extent can these rights then be limited? In 
other words, can an individual limit his or her own constitutional rights validly by 
choice, even though such a limitation would not be under law of general application? 
 
To find the answer to this question one must look for law that either permits the 
action in question or confirms the lack of a prohibition against the action. This would 
be in accordance with a basic legal principle: when legislation does not provide for 
certain situations, one must always return to the provisions of the common law. It is 
important to keep in mind that courts must apply or if necessary develop the 
common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to the applicable 
right.44 
 
It is possible, however, to make the argument that using a common law defence 
such as volenti non fit injuria to justify the limitation of rights is in fact law of general 
application. Consequently this would in fact fall within the scope of the limitation 
clause. This is in line with the beginning of section 36(1), which states that: "The 
rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of…"45 
 
It thus seems that the only valid limitation of rights in the Bill of Rights will be in 
terms of law of general application, which includes legislation, the common law and 
customary law.46 
                                        
42  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 169. 
43  Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC). This view is shared by Cheadle et al South African 
Constitutional Law 30-9. 
44  S 8(3) of the Constitution. 
45  The writers' own emphasis. 
46  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 169. 
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Once it has been established that the limitation in question is in fact through law of 
general application, it must be shown that the limitation is both reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society that is based on the values of equality, 
human dignity and freedom, by taking into account the factors set out in section 
36(1)(a)-(e). Currie and De Waal47 states that "[t]he reasons for limiting a right need 
to be exceptionally strong". They contend that section 36 has the consequence not 
only of requiring an important purpose for the valid limitation of rights in the Bill of 
Rights, but also of requiring that the restriction must also be able to achieve its 
purpose, and that no other realistic solution exists that is able to achieve the same 
purpose without the limitation or by means of a lesser limitation.48 
 
The determination of whether the limitation of a right in the Bill of Rights is 
justifiable or not needs to occur in accordance with the provisions set out in section 
36. This is a two-stage process. Firstly, it must be determined if a constitutionally 
entrenched right has indeed been limited. Secondly, it has to be determined if the 
infringement can be justified.49 This is done by considering the factors listed in 
section 36(1)(a)-(e). The weighing of these factors must be viewed as a balancing 
act. They are not to be used as a check-list.50 This balancing act requires an 
assessment that is based on proportionality.51 In balancing conflicts between rights, 
the court uses the right to dignity as a primary mechanism to resolve these 
conflicts.52 It is therefore not non-compliancy with one of these factors that results 
in the limitation being deemed to be unreasonable in terms of section 36 of the 
Constitution, but rather the collective effect of all these factors taken together. 
 
                                        
47  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 164. 
48  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 164. Also see Chapter 34 of Woolman et al 
Constitutional Law for more on the limitation clause. 
49  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 166. 
50  S v Manamela 2000 3 SA 1 (CC) 19. 
51  Devenish South African Constitution 182. 
52  Botha 2009 Stell LR 215. 
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The limitation of organ procurement methods to one method that has been proven 
to be ineffective also needs to be tested against the limitation clause.53 The 
limitation of each of the specific rights will be addressed further in paragraphs 5.5.1- 
5.5.6, dealing with the applicable rights in the Bill of Rights on an individual basis. 
 
4 The interpretation of the Bill of Rights 
 
In order to ascertain the meaning of a provision in the Constitution, the provision 
needs to be interpreted according to the rules of interpretation.54 Currie and De 
Waal55 identify two stages of interpretation: firstly, determining the meaning or the 
scope of a right, and secondly, whether or not the challenged law or conduct is in 
conflict with the right. Section 39 of the Constitution regulates the interpretation of 
the Bill of Rights and states that a court, tribunal or forum must promote the Bill of 
Rights when interpreting any legislation or developing the law. 
 
Although interpreting the Constitution will be in many ways the same as interpreting 
any other text, it is still a unique document in many ways, and there are additional 
factors that that need to be taken into account. These factors include the history 
leading to and resulting in the Constitution's being drafted, and the circumstances 
under which it was drafted. Furthermore, there are core values entrenched in the Bill 
of Rights, namely equality, human dignity, and freedom that need to be promoted 
whenever the Bill of Rights is interpreted. This is also known as the so-called 
purposive interpretation and can help to give more content to broadly formulated 
rights.56 Further aid can also be found in previous judgments of the Constitutional 
Court, as well as in both international and foreign law. 
 
                                        
53  If opting in can't pass the test in ss 36 and 27 read together, there will be an active duty on the 
state to replace it with another organ procurement method. 
54  For general introductory rules on interpretation, see Botha Statutory Interpretation 2012. For 
more on constitutional interpretation, see Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 145-162. 
See also De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation. 
55  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 145. 
56  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 148. 
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Care must be taken to adhere to the obligations created by section 39. They are, 
inter alia, that the three core values57 must be promoted,58 that international law 
must be considered when interpreting the Bill of Rights,59 and that the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights must be promoted when dealing with legislation, the 
common law or customary law.60 Ultimately, the interpretation of the provisions of 
the Constitution is the task of the judiciary, and more specifically the judges of the 
Constitutional Court, as the cases appear before them. 
 
5 Specific rights 
 
There are various constitutionally entrenched rights that are specifically important in 
the context of organ transplants and, more specifically, methods of organ 
procurement. The writers thus proceed to deal with each of these applicable rights 
separately, considering the scope, interpretation and possible limitation of each 
specific right. Relevant case law and the development thereof are also discussed, 
and the significance thereof is pointed out. Consequently the influence of the 
Constitution on organ procurement is discussed under each paragraph respectively. 
 
5.1 Equality61 
 
Section 9(1) of the Constitution states that "[e]veryone is equal before the law and 
has the right to equal protection and benefit from the law". This section is extremely 
important, especially in a South African context, as it states clearly that the state 
may not discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone inter alia on grounds of 
religion, belief or culture.62 
 
                                        
57  Equality, human dignity and freedom. 
58  S 39(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
59  S 39(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
60  S 39(2) of the Constitution. 
61  S 9 of the Constitution. 
62  S 9(3) of the Constitution. 
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South Africa is known as a multi-cultural country with people from various religions, 
beliefs and cultures calling it home.63 This can be very problematic for the legislature 
when enacting legislation that cannot discriminate on any of the grounds listed in 
section 9. Any legislation, including legislation regulating the methods of organ 
procurement, has to accommodate all the various religions and cultures, enabling 
members to practise their choice of religion freely, without unreasonably limiting the 
rights of others or placing a burden on them.64 This is especially difficult with 
regards to organ procurement methods and organ transplantation in general, as 
there are several cultures, religions and beliefs that complicate the ethics around 
organ transplantation.65 
 
Furthermore, section 9(1) places everyone as equal before the law and gives 
everyone the right to equal protection and benefit from the law. Any legislation thus 
enacted by the legislature must allow for the equal benefit of the rights contained 
therein and make provision to achieve the realisation of these rights.66 Even if 
legislation makes provision for organ donation without prima facie discriminating 
against a specific group, it might still not comply with section 9(1). This is indeed the 
case with the current organ procurement system, opting-in,67 as it is unsuccessful in 
obtaining enough organs to meet the required demand.68 Therefore, although there 
is currently legislation69 making provision for organ donation, as it does not have the 
ability to provide enough organs to meet the demand, it cannot satisfy the 
requirements of equal protection and equal benefit as set out in section 9(1). It is 
                                        
63  The Preamble of the Constitution states that South Africans are "united in our diversity". 
64  To give effect to s 9, the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 
2000 was enacted. 
65  Such as Jehova's Witnesses, who can't receive a blood transfusion, or some African tribes' 
beliefs. For more on different cultures and religions in South Africa, specifically in the context of 
organ transplantation, see Slabbert Handeldryf. See also Ebrahim and Haffejee Shari'ah and 
Organ Transplants; Goolam "Human Organ Transplantation"; Veatch Transplantation Ethics 1-
27; and Slabbert, Mnyongani and Goolam 2011 Koers 261. 
66  The right to equality thus protects the ethical principle of justice, and specifically rights justice. 
For more on the ethical principle of justice, see Labuschagne Analysis of Organ Transplantation 
ch 4.3.4. 
67  Opting-in relies on obtaining the consent of the donor prior to donation and is therefore founded 
on the principle of autonomy. 
68  For more on the methods of organ procurement and the shortcomings of opting-in as an organ 
procurement method, see Labuschagne Analysis of Organ Transplantation ch 3. 
69  Namely, the National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
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submitted that the current organ allocation practice of distributing one out of every 
two organs to a state hospital and one to the private sector could be a clear violation 
of section 9(1). This is because only about 27.7% of the population that requires in-
patient treatment receives it in the private sector.70 Ackermann is of the opinion that 
there will be a violation of section 9(1) if the differentiation or lacuna (in this case) 
does not have a "rational connection to a legitimate government purpose".71 
 
The importance of the interrelation between equality and human dignity must not be 
underestimated. "[H]uman dignity is the criterion of reference or the criterion of 
attribution essential to the understanding of equality."72 With this statement, 
Ackermann argues that equality, as a legal concept, can't fully make sense when 
being applied to human beings unless a criterion of reference or attribution is used 
to determine in respect of what human beings are equal.73 He argues that human 
dignity or human worth must be the criterion of reference or attribution.74 Therefore 
the right to equality must be viewed together with the right to human dignity.75 
 
5.2 Human dignity76 
 
Section 10 of the Constitution states that "everyone has inherent dignity and the 
right to have their dignity respected and protected".77 The idea of inherent dignity or 
                                        
70  HSRC 2013 
http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/3895/06%20HEALTH%20CARE%20SERVICES.pdf. 
71  Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 3 SA 1012 (CC) 1024-1025. Ackermann Human Dignity 182. 
72  Ackermann Human Dignity 212-214. 
72  S 10 of the Constitution. 
73  Ackermann Human Dignity 85. 
74  Ackermann Human Dignity 85. 
75  Botha 2009 Stell LR 212-214. In Prinsloo v Van der Linde the court held that any infringement on 
human dignity as a result of unequal treatment would be regarded as prima facie unfair 
discrimination in terms of s 9 (Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 3 SA 1012 (CC) 1026). See also 
Devenish South African Constitution 62. 
76  S 10 of the Constitution. 
77  S 10 thus describes dignity in two ways: firstly, as inherent to all human beings, and secondly, 
as an enforceable right. "However much the right to dignity may suffer infringement in an 
imperfect world, the inherent dignity that everyone has cannot be destroyed." Ackermann 
Human Dignity 95. 
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intrinsic worth is the key to fully understand the concept of human dignity.78 To 
Ackermann: 
 
[t]he human worth (dignity) of each and every person is the capacity for and the 
right to respect as a human being… which in turn separate humans from the 
impersonality of nature, enables them to exercise their own judgment, to have self-
awareness and a sense of self-worth, to exercise self-determination, to shape 
themselves and nature, to develop their personalities and to strive for self-fulfilment 
in their lives.79 
 
Human dignity thus needs to be viewed in the context of daily human life, where 
dignity is achieved by individuals in their individualism. In their daily life, thoughts, 
choices and actions people are living out their human dignity.80 
 
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, one "must promote the values that underlie an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom".81 
Dignity is further enshrined in section 7(1)82 as well as being one of the founding 
values of the Republic of South Africa,83 and thus enjoys ample protection under the 
Constitution. Dignity is referred to in eight different sections of the Constitution.84 In 
these sections, it functions as a first order rule,85 a second order rule86 and a 
correlative right,87 as well as a value.88 The right to human dignity is thus one of the 
core values entrenched in the Constitution.89 
                                        
78  Botha 2009 Stell LR 197. 
79  Ackermann Human Dignity 23-24. 
80  Dignity gives effect to the ethical principle of non-maleficence, meaning to refrain from causing 
harm (Dhai and McQuoid-Mason Bioethics 44). Dignity further protects the ethical principle of 
justice, and more specifically rights justice (Dhai and McQuoid-Mason Bioethics 46). 
81  S 39(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
82  S 7(1) reads: "This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the 
rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality 
and freedom." 
83  S 1 of the Constitution reads: "The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state 
founded on the following values: (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms." 
84  Dignity is entrenched in ss 1, 7(1), 10, 36(1), 39(1), 165(4), 181(3) as well as s 196(3) of the 
Constitution. 
85  Woolman et al Constitutional Law 36-19-20. 
86  Woolman Constitutional Law 36-20-21. 
87  Woolman Constitutional Law 36-21-22.  
88  Woolman Constitutional Law 36-22-25; 36-19-25. See also Goolam 2001 PER 43. 
89  Devenish South African Constitution 61. 
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This is in line with the dictum of O'Regan in Dawood,90 that constitutional 
adjudication and interpretation are informed by human dignity at a range of levels. 
She considers human dignity to be a value that possibly informs all other rights and 
also as significant in the limitations analysis. More than a mere value, human dignity 
is also a justiciable and enforceable right that must be respected and protected. 
Where the value of human dignity is offended, the primary constitutional breach 
may indeed be that of a specific right.91 
 
Defining the term dignity is much harder than establishing its importance.92 Currie 
and De Waal93 rightly state: "Though we can be certain of the pivotal importance of 
human dignity in the Constitution we can be less certain of the meaning of the 
concept." 
 
Woolman attempts to arrive at five primary objectives of dignity.94 An important 
facet of dignity is the right to self-actualisation.95 Ackermann J believes that 
possessing dignity and freedom is necessary to achieving self-actualisation.96 
Another noteworthy point is the fact that the courts view dignity not only as an 
individual's characteristic but also as a communal characteristic.97 This approach is 
clearly enunciated in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers:98 
 
                                        
90  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC). 
91  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) 961-962. 
92  Botha 2009 Stell LR 200-201. 
93  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 273. 
94  The five primary objectives of dignity, as identified by Woolman, are: 1) individual as an end-in-
herself; 2) equal concern and equal respect; 3) self-actualisation; 4) self-governance and 5) 
collective responsibility for the material condition of agency. Woolman Constitutional Law 36-7, 
36-10-12, 36-14. 
95  Woolman Constitutional Law 36-11. This facet of human dignity therefore allows the individual to 
act autonomously. 
96  Ferreira v Levin 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 1013-1014. "Human dignity cannot be fully valued or 
respected unless individuals are able to develop their humanity, their 'humanness' to the full 
extent of its potential… An individual's human dignity cannot be fully respected or valued unless 
the individual is permitted to develop his or her unique talents optimally. Human dignity has little 
value without freedom; for without freedom personal development and fulfilment are not 
possible. Without freedom, human dignity is little more than an abstraction. Freedom and dignity 
are inseparably linked. To deny people their freedom is to deny them their dignity." 
97  Botha 2009 Stell LR 204-205. 
98  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC). 
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It is not only the dignity of the poor that is assailed when homeless people are 
driven from pillar to post in a desperate quest for a place where they and their 
families can rest their heads. Our society as a whole is demeaned when state action 
intensifies rather than mitigates their marginalisation.99 
 
Dignity must thus be viewed as more than merely a set of duties owed to individuals 
by the state. It also has to be seen as a form of collective good, where dignity arises 
from the mutual recognition between individuals of the value of the other.100 
 
In S v Williams the Constitutional Court held that "[i]t is therefore reasonable to 
expect that the State must be foremost in upholding those values which are the 
guiding light of civilised societies. Respect for human dignity is one such value…"101 
There is thus a duty on the state to ensure that the need to respect people's dignity 
is not ignored when important decisions are made by the State or any organ of 
State.102 The Constitutional Court held in Grootboom, in the context of the right to 
housing in terms of section 26 of the Constitution, that: 
 
Section 26, read in the context of the Bill of Rights as a whole, must mean that the 
respondents have a right to reasonable action by the state in all circumstances and 
with particular regard to human dignity. In short, I emphasise that human beings 
are required to be treated as human beings.103 
 
                                        
99  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) 227. See also Khoza v 
Minister of Social Development 2004 6 SA 505 (CC) 538, where the court notes that the personal 
well-being of the wealthier members in a community is dependent the on the minimum well-
being of the poor. 
100  Woolman Constitutional Law 36-15. Dignity can therefore be achieved by adhering to the 
principle of beneficence - in other words, by doing good. For more on beneficence, see 
Labuschagne Analysis of Organ Transplantation ch 4.4.3. This also illustrates the need for the 
tolerance required by dignity (Goolam 2001 PER 48-49). 
101  S v Williams 1995 3 SA 632 (CC) 655. 
102  Goolam 2001 PER 46. See also Devenish South African Constitution 63. Any reduction or 
limitation of individual liberty for the sake of the collective good must, however, be justified in 
terms of the limitation clause. 
103  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) 83. Own emphasis 
added. 
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This judgment is in line with the judgment in S v Williams. Woolman contends that 
the brief history of our new-found ability to recognize the inherent dignity104 of our 
fellow South Africans is meant to suggest how the extension of this right progresses 
from mere duties of justice to duties of virtue that have as their aim the qualitative 
perfection of humanity.105 
 
This is an appealing thought in the sense that it establishes a movement back to one 
of the oldest forms of ethics in the Western world, namely virtue ethics.106 The 
earliest writings on virtue ethics come from the well-known Greek Philosopher, 
Aristotle, and it was widely revived in the 20th century.107 It requires one to consider 
the character and virtue that the doer acted with and thus looks at the subjective 
mind, intentions and attitude of the doer, rather than merely considering the act 
itself. 
 
Dignity's relationship to the different substantive rights in the Bill of Rights will 
influence and shape our understanding thereof.108 Even if the basic idea of what 
dignity entails stays the same, it will be examined by looking through a differently 
coloured lens. As O'Regan observes in Dawood: 
 
Section 10, however, makes it plain that dignity is not only a value fundamental to 
our Constitution, it is a justiciable and enforceable right that must be respected and 
protected. In many cases, however, where the value of human dignity is offended, 
the primary Constitutional breach occasioned may be of a more specific right such 
as the right to bodily integrity…109 
 
This indicates that both in general, and more specifically in the context of medical 
law, if the infringement could be addressed under another right, that is how it 
should be done, and dignity will then function only as a value that informs the right, 
                                        
104  The notion of inherent dignity is an important one, as it reaffirms that every human being has 
intrinsic worth. Liebenberg 2005 SAJHR  6-7. 
105  Woolman Constitutional Law 36-2. 
106  Moodley Medical Ethics 20. 
107  Moodley Medical Ethics 29. 
108  Woolman Constitutional Law 36-25. 
109  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) 962. See also Botha 2009 Stell LR 198-
199 for a discussion on the different applications of dignity as a right and dignity as a value. 
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rather than as a right on its own.110 If, for instance, an infringement of a persons' 
right to dignity is also an infringement under section 12(2)(b) or section 27 of the 
Constitution, the case should be brought on one of the latter sections, and not on 
section 10.111 This, however, does not lead to dignity's being less important in the 
matter. Dignity remains a value that must be taken into consideration when dealing 
with the Bill of Rights.112 The court in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security113 
stated that the court's obligation to develop the common law is not discretionary, 
and that the courts have a "general obligation" to develop the common law where 
necessary.114 The court went so far as to say that courts might in certain 
circumstances be obliged to raise this matter on their own.115 Furthermore, the 
values in the Constitution must "guide the development of all areas of law".116 The 
most significant finding of the court was that there rests a positive duty on the state 
to protect the rights in sections 10, 11 and 12 of the Constitution.117 Merely 
refraining from infringing these rights would therefore not always be sufficient.118 
The state must actively protect the rights to dignity, life, freedom, and the security 
of the person. 
 
As can be seen from the discussion under the right to life in terms of section 11,119 
the rights to life and human dignity are intertwined and dependent on one another. 
Without life, there can't be dignity. However, without dignity, the quality of human 
life can be compromised.120 O'Regan J held that dignity "is the foundation of many 
of the other rights that are specifically entrenched…"121 Chaskalson agrees in the 
                                        
110  Woolman Constitutional Law 36-22. 
111  Botha 2009 Stell LR 198. 
112  For this reason, an analysis of dignity in the context of specific other rights in the Bill of Rights is 
pivotal to the discussion here. 
113  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC). 
114  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 322. 
115  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 322. 
116  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 227. See also Botha 2009 Stell 
LR 200. 
117  Namely, the rights to life, dignity, freedom, and the security of the person. Carmichele v Minister 
of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 324. See also Botha 2009 Stell LR 200. 
118  Botha 2009 Stell LR 200. 
119  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) 506. 
120  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) 506.  
121  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) 440-441. 
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same case by contending that the rights to life and dignity enjoy greater importance 
than any other human right, which importance must be made clear by the state in 
its conduct.122 
 
Carstens and Pearmain states that: "Health is an essential for life and for human 
dignity… The capacity for the enjoyment of the rights to life and human dignity is 
obviously significantly diminished by poor health."123 This statement makes it clear 
that having good health, or at the very least access to health care, can promote the 
rights to life and human dignity. On the flip side, a lack of access to transplantable 
organs could result in denying individuals the right to dignity and compromising their 
right to life. In the context of organ transplantation, and more specifically organ 
procurement, human dignity is thus one of the most important rights to adhere to. It 
is important that the process of organ transplantation as a whole needs to be 
dignified. Every step taken in the process needs to respect the various role-player's 
right to dignity. This means that the method of organ procurement, the consent 
needed, the manner in which consent is obtained, the allocation procedures, the 
harvesting method, the care and treatment provided after the transplant has been 
completed, and any other action relevant to organ transplants need to be performed 
in a manner as that is as dignified as is possible. This is in line with one of the 
requirements for the valid limitation of any right in terms of section 36, namely that 
less restrictive means to achieve the purpose must at least have been considered in 
order for a constitutionally entrenched right to be limited justifiably.124 It is on this 
very basis, namely that the state did not consider alternative organ procurement 
methods when enacting new legislation, namely the National Health Act, whilst it is 
well known that the supply of transplantable organs does not meet the demand, that 
the conclusion may be reached that opting-in denies patients their dignity. 
                                        
122  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) 451. "The rights to life and dignity are the most important 
of all human rights, and the source of all other personal rights in [the Bill of Rights]. By 
committing ourselves to a society founded on the recognition of human rights we are required to 
value these two rights above all others. And this must be demonstrated by the state in 
everything it does…" 
123  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 29. 
124  S 36(1)(e) of the Constitution. 
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Consequently, as less restrictive means were not considered, this will also not 
constitute a justifiable limitation in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. 
 
From the discussion above the conclusion may be reached that the influence of the 
Constitution is of paramount importance in any discussion on the law relating to 
organ transplants. What is just as clear is that the different rights in the Bill of Rights 
may be in conflict with one another. The same is true for values such as human 
dignity, equality and freedom, to the extent that where these values inform specific 
rights, the content of one value may be very different in the context of different 
rights. One example of this would be that respecting one's dignity as a value might 
require that one is not refused life-saving treatment, if it exists, in the context of the 
right to life. Contrary to this, dignity might determine that the state should not save 
a few lives by granting everyone unqualified access to expensive medical 
procedures, which in turn could result in the collapse of the public health sector. 
Respecting people's dignity then becomes a balancing act between the conflicting 
rights and the application of the limitation clause to find the best solution to the 
problem at hand.125 This is no easy or clear-cut task and trying to predict how the 
courts will handle such an issue would be pure speculation. 
 
However, the various rights in the Bill of Rights do not only stand in conflict with 
another. On the contrary, they usually support and enhance one another. This is 
particularly true for dignity when it functions as a value, as it informs almost all the 
other rights in the Bill of Rights to some extent.126 Venter asks two very important 
questions: "[C]an any human dignity exist in relation to renal dialysis? Can any 
human dignity be lost when a kidney donor receives a form of remuneration for the 
donation of his kidney?"127 
 
                                        
125  S v Manamela 2000 3 SA 1 (CC) 19. 
126  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) 961-962. 
127  Venter Selection of Constitutional Perspectives 38. 
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It has been argued that a patient receiving renal dialysis is not leading a dignified 
and humane life.128 However, even if the treatment might not seem to be purely 
humane or dignified, receiving renal dialysis must certainly be more humane and 
dignified than not receiving treatment at all, especially when the purpose of the 
treatment is taken into account. On the other hand, the most dignified option would 
be to receive an organ for transplantation as soon as possible and thus to spend as 
little time as possible on dialysis. One proposed solution is to allow the sale of 
organs.129 From the above discussion, it can be derived that there are arguments 
based on the right to human dignity either in favour of and against allowing the sale 
of organs. 
 
5.3 Life130 
 
Section 11 of the Constitution grants "everyone" an unqualified right to life. This 
constitutionally entrenched right, although only six words in length, is perhaps the 
most important right of all. Without life, all other rights become almost instantly 
worthless, with very few exceptions to this general rule.131 The right to life is 
comprehensively discussed by the Constitutional Court in Makwanyane. O'Regan J 
stated: 
 
The right to life is, in one sense, antecedent to all the other rights in the 
Constitution. Without life in the sense of existence, it would not be possible to 
exercise rights or to be the bearer of them. But the right to life was included in the 
Constitution not simply to enshrine the right to existence. It is not life as mere 
organic matter that the Constitution cherishes, but the right to human life: the right 
to live as a human being, to be part of a broader community, to share in the 
experience of humanity. This concept of human life is at the centre of our 
constitutional values. The constitution seeks to establish a society where the 
individual value of each member of the community is recognised and treasured. 
The right to life is central to such a society. The right to life, thus understood, 
incorporates the right to dignity. So the rights to human dignity and life are 
entwined. The right to life is more than existence, it is a right to be treated as a 
                                        
128  Venter Selection of Constitutional Perspectives 38. 
129  For support of the sale of organs in a South African context, see Slabbert Handeldryf; Slabbert 
2008 Koers  75; and Venter Selection of Constitutional Perspectives. 
130  S 11 of the Constitution. 
131  For instance, the rights to dignity and privacy are respected and protected even after death in 
the form of doctor-patient confidentiality. 
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human being with dignity: without dignity, human life is substantially diminished. 
Without life, there cannot be dignity. This was recognised by the Hungarian 
constitutional court in the case in which it considered the constitutionality of the 
death penalty: 
 
It is the -untouchability and equality contained in the right to human dignity that 
results in man's right to life being a specific right to human life (over and above 
animals' and artificial subjects' right to being); on the other hand, dignity as a 
fundamental right does not have meaning for the individual if he or she is dead. ... 
Human dignity is a naturally accompanying quality of human life.'… The importance 
of dignity as a founding value of the new Constitution cannot be overemphasised. 
Recognising a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of 
human beings: human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and 
concern.132 
 
The right to life, then, as enshrined in the Constitution, involves much more than 
merely the right to existence. According to Justice O'Regan, life must be dignified 
life. It is thus not life as the absence of death (as when a person is in a persistent 
vegetative state) that the Constitution cherishes, but the right to live as a human 
being, being part of a community, being able to share in the experience of humanity, 
that is the goal. Interaction with the world around us is thus the key to having a 
dignified life, and the right to being treated with respect and concern is included in 
the right to human dignity.133 
 
The argument can be made that because persons in a persistent vegetative state 
can have no meaningful interaction with their surroundings, both their dignity and 
their quality of life are significantly reduced. As O'Regan J134 rightly states: "… 
without dignity, human life is substantially diminished". If your dignity is 
automatically reduced when you are in a persistent vegetative state, how does one 
ensure that the right to dignity for these people is still respected? It is submitted 
that this can be achieved by treating them with respect and concern, specifically 
with respect for bodily integrity, patient autonomy,135 and what the person would 
have wanted, had they been able to convey the message to others. It comes down 
                                        
132  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) 506-507, writers' own emphasis. 
133  S 10 of the Constitution. 
134  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) 506. 
135  As enshrined in s 12(2)(b) of the Constitution. 
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to allowing a person in a persistent vegetative state the little freedom that is left in 
her life, such as donating her organs. 
 
Woolman contends that section 11 read with section 7(2) not only provides a 
safeguard against killing or the diminution of life, but also imposes positive 
obligations on the state to protect life.136 These positive obligations include inter alia 
the duty of the state to enact legislation to preserve life where possible. Changing 
the current organ procurement system to a more effective one would consequently 
both promote and protect the right to life. Refusing to change the current organ 
procurement method results in directly denying individuals a chance of life. 
 
The right to life prima facie involves preserving life whenever and wherever possible. 
It is one of the most important rights in the Bill of Rights, as life is a pre-requisite for 
the enjoyment of all the other rights in the Bill of Rights. Although dying is a part of 
life, and seen as the completion of life rather than the opposite thereof,137 it is 
human nature to extend and hold on to life as long as possible. Where there are life-
saving treatments available, it is against human nature to let a person die due to a 
lack of resources. Yet this is the reality in which we currently live.138 
 
5.4 Freedom and security of the person139 
 
Section 12(1) of the Constitution states that: "[e]veryone has the right to freedom 
and security of the person…" and continues to state in section 12(2)(b) that 
"[e]veryone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the 
right… (b) to security in and control over their body". Of specific importance for the 
current discussion is section 12(2)(b). Having security in and control over one's body 
is a fundamental principle of medical law, with far-reaching consequences. 
                                        
136  Woolman Constitutional Law 39-14. 
137  Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwa-Zulu Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) 784. 
138  Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwa-Zulu Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) 782. Sachs J contended 
that "the rationing of access to life-prolonging resources is regarded as integral to, rather than 
incompatible with, a human rights approach to health care". 
139  S 12 of the Constitution. 
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Section 12(2)(b) clearly gives everyone a constitutionally entrenched right to bodily 
integrity. In the context of medical law, section 12(2)(b) supports and promotes the 
principle of patient autonomy.140 This is done in two ways: by granting a right to a) 
security in, and b) control over one's body. Currie and De Waal141 gives the following 
concise explanation to point out the difference between a) and b): 
 
"Security in" and "control over" one's body are not synonyms. The former denotes 
the protection of bodily integrity against intrusions by the state and others. The 
latter denotes the protection of what could be called bodily autonomy against 
interference. The former is a component of the right to be left alone in the sense of 
being unmolested by others. The latter is a component of the right to be left alone 
in the sense of being allowed to live the life one chooses. 
 
In practice patient autonomy is achieved by obtaining informed consent from the 
patient before any action is taken.142 Informed consent is thus in many ways 
inseparable from patient autonomy, and thus also from the right to the freedom and 
security of the person, which are in no way new concepts in South African law.143 
Both patient autonomy and informed consent have developed considerably during 
the last century, as can clearly be seen in the relevant case law. A short discussion 
of the case law follows, to show the progressive support for these two principles. 
 
As early as 1923, in the case of Stoffberg v Elliot,144 the court looked at the right to 
security of the person and patient autonomy. The facts of this case are as follows: 
Mr Stoffberg was a patient of Dr Elliott and scheduled to undergo treatment for 
cancer of his penis. During the operation it was discovered that the cancer was 
much more advanced than expected and Dr Elliott consequently amputated the 
penis. This constituted a clear deviation from the consent given by Mr Stoffberg prior 
to being anaesthetised. Watermeyer J stated that "every person has certain absolute 
                                        
140  In addition to autonomy's being protected in s 12(2)(b), autonomy is further protected in the 
Constitution by s 11, which embodies the right to life, and by s 14, which deals with the right to 
privacy. Dhai and McQuoid-Mason Bioethics 39. 
141  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 308-309. 
142  This is required by ss 6 and 7 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003 as well. 
143  See Stoffberg v Elliott 1923 CPD 148. 
144  Stoffberg v Elliott 1923 CPD 148. 
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rights… and one of those rights is the right of absolute security of the person."145 He 
went further and added: 
 
… a man, by entering a hospital, does not submit himself to such surgical treatment 
as the doctors in attendance upon him may think necessary… By going into 
hospital, he does not waive or give up his right of absolute security of the 
person…146 
 
It is important to note that constitutional rights are not absolute and can be limited 
by the limitations clause.147 Sadly, the Constitutional Court has not had the chance 
to interpret section 12(2)(b) directly as of yet.148 Much of what is written about this 
section thus remains pure speculation or an educated guess at best. Determining for 
instance whether it is an unjustified limitation not to allow one to sell a bodily organ 
is thus no easy task. 
 
Clearly, not allowing a person to sell an organ is a limitation of section 12(2)(b), as it 
limits one's "control over" one's body. The Constitutional Court has stated through 
O'Regan J and Sachs J in a dissenting judgment that the human body is not 
something to be commoditised and that the Constitution demands respect for the 
human body.149 The reason for this, however, seems to be that "[t]he very character 
of [prostitution] devalues the respect that the Constitution regards as inherent in the 
human body".150 
 
It seems that the real problem they have is thus not the commoditisation of the 
human body, but rather treating it without the required respect. 
 
Section 12(2)(b) specifically states that everyone has the right "to security in and 
control over their body." The question that now arises is when, in the context of 
                                        
145  Stoffberg v Elliott 1923 CPD 148. 
146  Stoffberg v Elliott 1923 CPD 149. 
147  S 36 of the Constitution. For a comprehensive discussion of the right of absolute security of the 
person in the context of the Stoffberg- case, see Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 
879-883. 
148  Woolman Constitutional Law 40-89. 
149  S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) 671. 
150  S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 671 (CC). 
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organ transplants, is an organ still part of the body? Certainly up until it is removed, 
it still forms part of your body. Is the fact that a removed organ was once a part of 
your body enough to keep regarding it as part of you? And when it is transplanted 
into another human being, at what point does it become part of that person's body? 
Is the organ alienated form your body once you give permission to donate, when the 
organ is removed, or after it has been transplanted? Basically, the question comes 
down to how long after removal from the body should one have control over one's 
body parts. The answer would also be important to determining the last point at 
which permission to donate could be revoked. This question has been addressed 
neither by the legislature nor by the courts. However, it is bound to surface within 
the foreseeable future. 
 
Something that is noteworthy is a particular defence, volenti non fit iniuria, stating 
that no harm can be done to someone that consents thereto.151 This ties in closely 
to the doctrine of informed consent. Informed consent in South African law dates 
back to the case of Castell v De Greef,152 where the requirements of informed 
consent were introduced and imported into South African law.153 Castell v De Greef 
is commonly regarded as the locus classicus in this regard.154 
 
In this case the plaintiff underwent an unsuccessful subcutaneous mastectomy that 
resulted inter alia in necrosis and deformation of the areolae of the plaintiff. The 
court rejected the reasonable-doctor approach and replaced it with the doctrine of 
informed consent, thereby moving away from medical paternalism and toward 
patient autonomy.155 This is clearly in support of the rights to self-determination and 
freedom and security of the person as voiced in section 12 of the Constitution. 
 
                                        
151  For a more detailed discussion on volenti non fit iniuria in this context, see Labuschagne Analysis 
of Organ Transplantation ch 2. 
152  Castell v De Greef 1994 4 SA 408 (C). 
153  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 891-892. 
154  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 891. 
155  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 892. 
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The rights to freedom and the security of the person are inextricably woven together 
with patient autonomy and informed consent, and together they form the basis of 
medical law. It is therefore simply logical that patient autonomy and informed 
consent should play a vital role in organ procurement law, and that any organ 
procurement should be compliant to the above. Based on the right to freedom and 
security of the person, any proposed organ procurement method will therefore need 
to adhere to patient autonomy by utilising informed consent, in order to adhere to 
the Constitution. "Because to take away a man's freedom of choice, even his 
freedom to make the wrong choice, is to manipulate him as though he were a 
puppet and not a person."156 Consequently, organ procurement by means of 
presumed consent or procurement from prisoners is entirely irreconcilable with 
section 12(2)(b) of the Constitution. Organ procurement methods such as opting-in 
or required response, and possibly also the sale of organs, however, supports and 
promotes the right to freedom and security of the person. 
 
5.5 Privacy157 
 
The right to privacy enables an individual to live free from interference from others 
and is of specific importance in medical and health care law.158 Section 14 of the 
Constitution states that "[e]veryone has the right to privacy". The right to privacy 
contained in section 14 does not include an exhaustive list of all the instances where 
privacy will be protected, but it does give four instances in subsections (a)-(d) that 
are definitely included in the right to privacy. Privacy has been interpreted numerous 
times by the Constitutional Court, and from its various judgments it is clear that 
privacy must be respected and upheld wherever possible. 
 
                                        
156  L'Engle date unknown http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/tag/human-rights. 
157  S 14 of the Constitution. 
158  Devenish goes as far as to state that privacy is a "basic human need". Devenish South African 
Constitution 79. 
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Langa DP159 states that "privacy is a right which becomes more intense the closer it 
moves to the personal sphere of the life of human beings, and less intense as it 
moves away from that core". From this quote it is clear that when dealing with any 
privacy issue related to healthcare, health and the life of a person, privacy must be 
given very high priority.160 It is submitted that this also holds true for the methods of 
organ procurement. When legislation does not provide individuals with adequate 
access to transplantable organs, the right to privacy of choice is denied by the 
legislature. 
 
O'Regan J and Sachs J summarise the Bernstein161 judgment as follows in Jordan: 
 
In Bernstein, Ackermann J held that the right to privacy in the interim Constitution 
must be understood as recognising a continuum of privacy rights which may be 
regarded as starting with a wholly inviolable inner self, moving to a relatively 
impervious sanctum of the home and personal life, and ending in a public realm 
where privacy would only remotely be implicated, if at all… There can be no doubt 
that autonomy to make decisions in relation to intensely significant aspects of one's 
personal life are encompassed by the term.162 
 
This ties in with the previous quote from Hyundai Motor Distributors, in the sense 
that the closer to the personal sphere, the more important privacy becomes, and 
thus the harder it becomes to limit the right. Limiting privacy in the public sphere 
versus limiting privacy in the private sphere was considered extensively in S v 
Jordan: 
 
Commercial sex involves the most intimate of activity taking place in the most 
impersonal and public of realms, the market place; it is simultaneously all about sex 
and all about money… A prohibition on commercial sex, therefore, will not ordinarily 
encroach upon intimate or meaningful human relationships. Yet it will intrude upon 
the intensely personal sphere of sexual intercourse, albeit intercourse for reward.163 
 
                                        
159  Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In 
Re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) 557. 
160  Another cause of the importance of the right to privacy is the overlap between the rights to 
privacy and dignity. Devenish South African Constitution 80. 
161  Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC). 
162  S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) 48-49. Own emphasis added. 
163  S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) 53. 
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Here it can be seen that there can be conflicting issues when it comes to limiting 
privacy. It is submitted that the same will hold true for the argument relating to the 
sale human kidneys. The sale of human kidneys can be seen as a purely commercial 
transaction: goods are supplied in exchange for money. On the other hand, 
however, the goods in this scenario are pieces of a person's body, an organ that 
only one person has autonomy over. As Currie and De Waal164 state: "This is a 
difficult opposition to mediate: the intimacy of the transaction would suggest that it 
is at the core of privacy while its mercantile aspects would put it in the public 
domain." 
 
In the context of organ transplants, there are a number of conflicting legislative 
instruments pertaining to privacy. There is the Promotion of Access to Information 
Act 2 of 2000 that grants the right to access to information and has the goal to 
"actively promote a society in which the people of South Africa have effective access 
to information to enable them to more fully exercise and protect all of their 
rights".165 
 
However, there are also sections 14-17 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003, which 
deal with confidentiality, access to and the protection of health records. From this it 
can be seen that although the State values the individuals' privacy, the right to 
privacy must be limited in certain instances in order to allow individuals to exercise 
their rights and for the health care industry to be able to function properly. It is 
submitted that by staying with opting-in as the method of organ procurement the 
state denies individuals privacy in making a very personal choice; indeed, it denies 
individuals a possible end-of-life decision. 
 
                                        
164  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 321. 
165  Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000, Preamble. Hereinafter referred to as "PAIA". 
D LABUSCHAGNE & PA CARSTENS   PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
 
 
236 
5.6 Health care166 
 
Section 27 specifies the various rights pertaining to health care and embodies so-
called socio-economic rights.167 There are, however, also other socio-economic rights 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights, such as section 26 of the Constitution, which relates 
to housing. As these rights themselves have inherent similarities, for the purpose of 
this discussion reference will also be made to judgments on other socio-economic 
rights where applicable under the current heading. 
 
Section 27(1) of the Constitution states that "[e]veryone has the right to have 
access to… health care services" and section 27(2) required the state to "…take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve 
the progressive realisation of each of these rights". 
 
Section 27 is important as it gives effect to the ethical principle of beneficence.168 In 
Soobramoney the Constitutional Court had to interpret section 27 of the 
Constitution. The facts of the case are briefly as follows: The Appellant in this case 
was a diabetic suffering from ischaemic heart disease and cerebro-vascular disease, 
as well as irreversible chronic renal failure. Due to the fact that the applicant was not 
free of significant vascular or cardiac disease, he was not eligible for a kidney 
transplant, and according to the Addington hospital policies and guidelines, therefore 
also not eligible for regular renal dialysis.169 
 
                                        
166  S 27 of the Constitution. 
167  Socio-economic rights are also known as second generation rights, that are based on the 
principle of social justice. Devenish South African Constitution 146. 
168  Beneficence means to do good. For more on beneficence, see Labuschagne Analysis of Organ 
Transplantation ch 4.4.3. 
169  The duty of the State regarding organ transplantation and the availability of resources for organ 
transplants was not discussed further in this case, as the Appellant was not eligible for a 
transplant due to medical reasons. 
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The court pointed out that the obligations imposed on the state by section 27 are 
"…dependent upon the resources available for such purposes, and that the 
corresponding rights themselves are limited by reason of the lack of resources".170  
 
The court also stated that: 
 
Some rights in the Constitution are the ideal and something to be strived for. They 
amount to a promise, in some cases, and an indication of what a democratic society 
aiming to salvage lost dignity, freedom and equality should embark upon. They are 
values which the Constitution seeks to provide, nurture and protect for a future 
South Africa. However, the guarantees of the Constitution are not absolute but may 
be limited in one way or another. In some instances, the Constitution states in so 
many words that the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources 'to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these 
rights.'171 
 
This clearly shows that in certain cases the court will value the wellbeing of a 
collective group higher than that of an individual, due to the limitation of section 
27(1) by section 27(2).172 Carstens and Pearmain173 correctly point out that "[t]he 
individualistic approach must have limits if society is to function successfully as a 
whole". In Grootboom the Court found that rather than granting a right to demand 
immediate relief, there exists a duty on the State to develop a comprehensive plan 
to meet the obligations imposed on it by the Constitution.174 According to Yacoob J, 
establishing whether a socio-economic right has been complied with requires one to 
establish whether the state has taken reasonable steps.175 Woolman believes that 
reasonable measures demand that the State both establish and implement a 
coherent, well-co-ordinated and inclusive programme with the aim of progressively 
realising the content of the right.176 
 
                                        
170  Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwa-Zulu Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) 771. 
171  S 27(2) of the Constitution. Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwa-Zulu Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 
(CC) 779. 
172  Moellendorf 1998 SAJHR 330. 
173  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 47. 
174  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) 67, 86. 
175  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) 66. 
176  Woolman Constitutional Law 56A-7. 
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What is noteworthy is that the decision in the Soobramoney-case might have been 
very different if decided after the proposed National Health Insurance had come into 
effect.177 This is because a large part of the judgment was based on the provisions 
in section 27(2), which states that the state must take reasonable legislative and 
other measures, within its available resources.178 Once National Health Insurance is 
in place, there might be a legal duty on the state to provide for social security in the 
form of access to dialysis or to make alternative treatment, such as organ 
transplants, available to all of those in need thereof.179 
 
A fact well worth mentioning is that the Constitutional Court does not follow a 
uniform approach when it comes to different socio-economic rights. Throughout its 
judgments a development in the thought process can be observed. In its various 
judgments the Court has considered the dignity interests of those parties seeking 
relief in terms of sections 26 or 27 in a progressively more serious manner.180 In 
Soobramoney Sachs J stated: "In all the open and democratic societies based on 
dignity, freedom and equality with which I am familiar, the rationing of access to 
life-prolonging resources is regarded as integral to, rather than incompatible with, a 
human rights approach to health care".181 According to Sachs, it is thus perfectly 
justifiable to limit access to resources that merely have the ability to lengthen the 
recipients' life.182 He goes even further by suggesting that not only is it justified, but 
also fundamental to an open and democratic society.183 
 
Contrary to the judgment in Soobramoney, the Court in Grootboom stressed the 
requirement that state action must in all circumstances be reasonable action with 
                                        
177  For more on Department of Health date unknown http://www.health.gov.za/nhi.php. 
178  This requirement is in line with the principle of justice, specifically distributive justice, as a social 
approach is preferred above an individualistic approach. Dhai and McQuoid-Mason Bioethics 145. 
179  National Health Insurance is still in its first, preparatory phase and it will still be several years 
before it is fully functional. 
180  Woolman Constitutional Law 36-59. 
181  Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwa-Zulu Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) 782. 
182  Although it is agreed that the rationing of resources is essential, it nonetheless remains a 
"tragedy for justice", especially in the case of rationing medical resources. Moellendorf 1998 
SAJHR 332. 
183  Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwa-Zulu Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) 782. 
D LABUSCHAGNE & PA CARSTENS   PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
 
 
239 
particular regard to human dignity.184 In Treatment Action Campaign185 further 
development of the Court's view on the importance of human dignity can be 
observed, as the argument of inadequate resources in casu was rejected by the 
Court. This was justified by stating that the needs of the affected people outweighed 
the financial implications on the State. The Court stated that refusing life-saving 
treatment in casu could in no way be consistent with respecting the right to human 
dignity. Here, the need to respect the dignity of those concerned thus outweighed 
the lack of adequate resources. Furthermore, it was found that the state had failed 
to adopt reasonable measures to enable the progressive realisation of the rights 
embodied in section 27.186 
 
What is noteworthy is that in Soobramoney life-lengthening treatment was denied 
on the grounds of inadequate resources, whereas in Treatment Action Campaign 
potential life-saving treatment was granted in spite of inadequate resources. From 
this it is clear that the effect of the treatment in question had an influence on the 
outcome of the court's decision. A clear distinction can thus be made between these 
two cases. In Treatment Action Campaign relief was granted as the relief directly 
protected the right to life, as entrenched in section 11, of a group of people. 
Granting the requested relief in Soobramoney would not have had the same effect, 
as it could not have saved a life, but merely prolonged it. This is significant, as the 
Court granted relief where the need was greater. The state is under an obligation to 
"provide care according to need rather than the ability to pay."187 The Treatment 
Action Campaign-judgment is also in accordance with the judgment in Grootboom, 
as "… a right to reasonable action by the state in all circumstances and with 
particular regard to human dignity"188 had been complied with. Socio-economic 
rights were seen as more than a mere key to bare survival, and comprised of "the 
development and exercise of the people's associational, intellectual and emotional 
                                        
184  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) 83. 
185  Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). 
186  Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) 750; see also Brand and 
Heyns Socio-economic Rights 139. 
187  Brand and Heyns Socio-economic Rights 132. 
188  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) 83. 
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capabilities".189 It thus seems as if the courts are gradually giving more importance 
to both socio-economic rights and human dignity, both as a right as found in section 
10 and as a value informing other fundamental human rights.190 
 
In considering socio-economic rights, the "reasonableness" standard is of great 
importance. Yacoob J191 states that "[r]easonableness must also be understood in 
the context of the Bill of Rights as a whole." Some of the elements of a reasonable 
plan listed by the court in Grootboom include: 
 
 sufficient flexibility to be able to cope with emergency, short-, medium- and 
long-term needs; 
 allocating appropriate financial and human resources to execute the plan; and 
 adequate legislation, policies and programmes to achieve the plan. This is 
inclusive of the implementation of the proper allocation of tasks and 
monitoring programmes.192 
 
In Glenister v President of the RSA: Helen Suzman Foundation as Amicus Curiae193 
the Court found that section 7(2) of the Constitution requires the state to take steps 
that are both reasonable and effective in order to fulfil constitutional rights.194 The 
court goes further to state that this duty rests, inter alia, on the Executive and 
Parliament when initiating and enacting legislation.195 There is thus a duty on the 
Executive and Parliament to actively ensure that legislation is enacted in order to 
                                        
189  Liebenberg 2005 SAJHR 8. 
190  As stated in ss 1, 7(1) and s 39(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
191  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) 69. 
192  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) 68-69. For a more 
detailed discussion on Grootboom, see Hassim, Heywood and Berger Health and Democracy 37-
39. These elements of a reasonable plan as part of the reasonableness requirement have to be 
considered in the light of human dignity. Liebenberg 2005 SAJHR 3. 
193  Glenister v President of the RSA: Helen Suzman Foundation as Amicus Curiae 2011 3 SA 347 
(CC). 
194  A court may require a "comprehensive explanation from the state on the measures elected to 
fulfil the socio-economic rights". Devenish South African Constitution 149. The state can 
therefore be held accountable by the courts and may be obliged to defend and explain its 
choices. 
195  Glenister v President of the RSA: Helen Suzman Foundation as Amicus Curiae 2011 3 SA 347 
(CC) paras 189-190. 
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make possible the fulfilment of constitutionally entrenched rights. In addition to this 
duty in terms of section 7(2), the court in Carmichele found that there is a duty on 
the state in terms of section 39(2) to develop the common law to protect the right to 
dignity, life, and freedom and security of the person.196 
 
With regard to the right of access to health care in terms of section 27, the Court 
held in Treatment Action Campaign that there is a duty on the state to establish the 
"progressive realisation of each of [the socio-economic rights entrenched in the 
Constitution]".197 Taking into account that this case was decided in 1997, it raises 
the question: What has been done since to realise the rights contained in section 
27? 
 
It is true that a new act with regard to health care has been promulgated since, 
namely the National Health Act,198 that came into effect on the 1st of March 2012.199 
However, the question remains whether or not the Act has achieved the standard of 
a reasonable legislative measure as required by section 27(2). It is the authors' 
submission that the National Health Act does not meet the standard of a reasonable 
legislative measure with regards to organ transplantation law, as required by section 
27(2). Venter raises the possibility that there might be a duty on the state to find 
alternative options if a specific resource has been limited for a number of years.200 
In casu, it is submitted that the state has a duty to find alternative measures to 
alleviate the constant organ shortage, by replacing the current organ procurement 
system of opting-in with a more suitable method of organ procurement.201 The Court 
in Port Elizabeth rightly held that that our entire society is demeaned when 
government action denies citizens' basic needs.202 
 
                                        
196  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 322. 
197  Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) 754. 
198  National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
199  Commencement of certain sections of the National Health Act (Act No 61 of 2003) Proc 11 in GG 
35081 on 27 February 2012. 
200  Venter Selection of Constitutional Perspectives 58. 
201  For more information on the different organ procurement methods, see Labuschagne Analysis of 
Organ Transplantation ch 3. 
202  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) 227. 
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6  Conclusion 
 
This article has investigated the constitutional influences on organ transplantation 
law, with specific reference to organ procurement methods. One of the main factors 
that has to be kept in mind when considering legal development is that the law can 
take a long time to change, it is conservative, and often a few years behind society's 
perspectives on morality and the law. 
 
However, there is a duty whenever new law is enacted or when existing law is 
amended, interpreted or limited to do so in a manner that protects and promotes 
the values underlying an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom. 
 
Each of the rights applicable to this study in the Bill of Rights was examined 
specifically in the light of the research topic. The scope and application of the 
limitation clause were also examined to determine whether and to what extent an 
individual can limit his or her own rights. What is clear from the study is that many 
of the rights in the Bill of Rights are intertwined and cannot be read in isolation. 
They inform one another and must thus be looked at together to form an overall 
picture. 
 
When considering any right in the Bill of Rights a comprehensive and complex study 
is required. There are many issues that deserve proper consideration: the application 
of the right, the meaning or content of the right, the interpretation of the right, 
other existing law, whether it be in the form of legislation, common law, case law or 
ethics; the limitation of the right; in the case of dignity, equality or freedom whether 
it operates as a right or a fundamental value; and so forth. Establishing what the 
court might find in a specific case is no easy task. 
 
Section 7(2) is applicable to all of the above rights and places a positive duty on the 
state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil these rights. In the context of organ 
transplants, this means that the state has a duty to allow people to exercise their 
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respective rights and to prevent third parties from interfering with someone's rights, 
as well as to establish a proper legislative framework to enable the progressive 
realisation of these rights. In the context of medical law, section 12(2)(b) and 
section 27(1) and 27(2), together with the value assigned by the Constitution to 
human dignity generally, should have the biggest influence on the choice of a 
suitable method of organ procurement. The determination of whether a method of 
organ procurement would be constitutionally acceptable or not would include an 
investigation into what constitutes "reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within [the State's] available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation" of 
chiefly the right to life.203 As was shown in the judgements in Soobramoney and 
Treatment Action Campaign, the Constitutional Court is inclined to grant lifesaving 
relief, even if there aren't available resources, rather than to grant mere life-
prolonging relief. 
 
It is submitted that the State has failed to provide a proper legislative framework to 
relieve the critical shortage of human organs available for transplantation, and has 
thus failed to uphold the applicable constitutional rights and values as discussed 
above. 
                                        
203  S 27(2) of the Constitution. 
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